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PERSONAL INJURY EXCLUSION: IS THE SLASHING
OF WRISTS NECESSARY?
by
DONALD J. ZAHN *
"Capital return... in tax accounting, payments received by taxpayer which rep-
resent the individual's cost or capital and hence not taxable as income.'
I. INTRODUCTION
What do damage awards really represent? Does a damage award stem-
ming from a personal injury lawsuit or settlement compensate the individual for
lost capabilities? Does a damage award confer a windfall upon that individual?
The predecessor statute of section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 19862 and the policy behind that statute equate damage awards to the wronged
individual as a return of capital.3 As years passed, the courts, as well as Congress
refined the return of capital concept, expanding the concept to include within its
boundaries all forms of personal injury recoveries. With the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner v. Schleie? in 1995, however, the
courts suddenly ignored previous reasoning, effectively obscuring any vestiges of
the return of capital concept for many types of personal injury.s Subsequently, this
deviation has been reinforced by the Congress.
This paper will examine the history of damage award taxation beginning
with the earliest income tax statute through the present law. Part II traces the 1918
and 1939 income Tax Code provisions and the court cases interpreting those pro-
visions. Part I addresses the 1954 income Tax Code provisions and the case law
which further defines tax aspects of damage awards, and Part IV outlines the 1986
tax reform legislation, the 1989 damage award changes, and recent United States
* Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. B.A., 1963, New York
University; J.D., 1966 Union University, Albany Law School; LL.M. [Taxation], 1967, New York
University School of Law. The author wishes to thank Cynthia K. Puff for her time and research in prepa-
ration of this article.
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 209 (6th ed. 1990).
2. Revenue Act of 1918 § 213(b)(6), Pub. L. No. 65-254, 40 Stat. 1066 (1919). (All references to the
current Internal Revenue Code of 1986 will be noted as "Code").
3. 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 304, 307 (1918).
4. Commissioner v. Schleier, - U.S.., 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
5. See also O'Gilvie v. United States, - U.S.-..., 117 S. Ct. 452 (1996); Schmitz v. Commissioner,
34 R3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994).
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Supreme Court rulings on the taxation of damage awards. Finally, Part V suggests
that the courts have turned their backs on traditional reasoning behind damage
award exclusion and have ignored the return of capital concept the statute was
designed to protect. Moreover, Congress may have enacted tax legislation in
response to court decisions, rather than basing the new legislation upon its own
determinations and criteria, for later interpretation by the courts.
II. HISTORY
A. 1918 Statute
Gross income includes "all income from whatever source derived .... "1
The Congress provided certain exclusions in calculating income. The 1918
income tax statute excluded from gross income:
... amounts received through accident or health insurance or
under workmen's compensation acts, as compensation for per-
sonal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any damages receiv-
ed whether by suit or agreement on account of such injuries or
sickness.7
The statute clearly excluded from gross income any insurance proceeds
as well as any compensation or damages awarded as a result of personal injury.
The statutory language clearly treats all such proceeds as non-taxable.
Furthermore, the United States Attorney General issued an opinion that
same year based upon the 1916 statute, discussing proceeds of accident policies,
and concluded that:
Without affirming that the human body is in a technical sense the
"capital" invested in an accident policy, in a broad, natural sense
the proceeds of the policy do but substitute, so far as they go,
capital which is the source of future periodical income. They mere-
ly take the place of capital in human ability which was destroyed
by the accident. They are therefore "capital" as distinguished
from "income" receipts.'
6. I.R.C. § 61(a) (1997).
7. Revenue Act of 1918 § 231(b)(6), Pub. L. No. 65-254, 40 Stat. 1066 (1919).
8. 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 304, 308 (1918).
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While the Attorney General reinforced the concept that insurance pro-
ceeds amount to a return of capital, the courts struggled with the same concept.9
In Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co.'0 the United States Supreme Court examined the
legislative intent surrounding certain corporation tax legislation." The plaintiff
corporation manufactured and sold lumber cut from its own lands. 2 The corpo-
ration then sold off the stumpage land after it cut and sold the timber from the
land. 3 The plaintiff claimed the proceeds from the sale of stumpage land repre-
sented a return of capital. 4 In its examination of Congressional intent, the Court
found the mere conversion of a capital asset was not to be treated as income. 5
The Court further found income is the gain derived from capital or labor, 6 and
that capital must be restored before gain or loss may be calculated. 7 The Doyle
opinion reasoned that "[w]hen the act took effect, plaintiff's timber lands, with
whatever value they possessed, were a part of its capital assets, and a subsequent
change of form by conversion into money did not change the essence."" The
Court therefore distinguished a return of capital from taxable income in the con-
text of value existing prior to the effective date of the tax legislation. 9
The United States Supreme Court continued its examination of the return
of capital concept in Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe.20 In Southern Pacific the
plaintiff owned and operated a railway line.2' The plaintiff accumulated a surplus
on its books prior to enactment of the Income Tax Act of 1913.21 However, the
plaintiff did not declare and pay dividends from the surplus until after the 1913
Act went into effect.23 The plaintiff argued that the dividend was not includible in
income, as the dividend was paid from surplus accumulated prior to the Act's
effective date.24 The Court rejected the contention that all receipts are character-
ized as income." It further rejected the contention that proceeds from conversion
9. For a different perspective see Steven Jay Stewart, Note, Damage Award Taxation under
Section 104(a)(2) of the LR.C. - Congress Clarifies Application of the Schleier Test, 47
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1255 (1997).
10. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918).
11. Id. at 183.
12. Id. at 181.
13.Id.
14. Id.
15. Doyle, 247 U.S. at 184.
16. Id. at 185.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 187.
19. Id. at 188.
20. Southern Pac. Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330 (1918).
21. Id. at 33.1-32.
22. Id. at 333.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Southern Pac., 247 U. S. at 335.
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of capital assets are to be considered income.26 Again, asset value accumulated
prior to the effective date, regardless of the form of the distribution, was consid-
ered a return of capital.
In early years, the income tax statute treated damage awards and insur-
ance proceeds as a return of human capital. Without many controversies to decide,
the courts relied on this overriding rationale and took a reasonable, not to mention
humane, approach.
B. 1939 Statute
Wording of the damage exclusion remained unchanged as the result of the
enactment of the 1939 Tax Code.27 However, the United States Supreme Court
refined the parameters of the definition of income in the 1940 case of Helvering
v. Clifford.28 The issue in Clifford concerned whether to represent the distribu-
tion of a temporary, self-settled trust as income.29 During the term, the trustee had
distributed the trust assets to the trust beneficiary, who then included the income
in her tax return. 0 The Commissioner, however, determined that the income
should have been taxed to the settlor.3' Although the opinion did not concern itself
with damage awards, the Clifford Court did examine the definition of gross
income.32 As such, the Court had no trouble treating the trust income as includi-
ble to the settlor, even though the statute itself failed to consider this type of
income.33
In support of its decision, the Clifford majority remarked that Congress
may use the full measure of its taxing power within certain definable categories.m
However, the better-reasoned dissent argued that Congress may not tax income
not within the boundaries of the Tax Act.35 Justice Roberts pointed out that legis-
lation is the function of Congress and it is not the role of the judiciary to supply
deficiencies in the Act.3 6 The dissent upholds the letter of the
statute and cautions the judiciary against writing, rather than interpreting, the
26. Id.
27. Internal Revenue Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-1, 53 Stat. 9 (1939).
28. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
29. Id. at 332.
30. Id. at 333-34.
31. Id. at 334.
32. Id.
33. See Helvering, 309 U. S. at 337.
34. Id. at 334.
35. Id. at 342 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 338 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
[VOL. 13
4
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 13 [1997], Art. 5
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol13/iss1/5
PERSONAL INJURY EXCLUSION
law.37 It is for its dissent that this case is cited, as this concept seems to have been
lost on subsequent courts.
The United States Supreme Court did uphold the plain meaning of the tax
statute in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.38 In Glenshaw Glass, the Court
considered whether punitive damages received by settlement of an antitrust vio-
lation were includible as income.39 The Court ultimately held that Congress did
not intend to carve out an exemption from the tax statute,40 as an examination of
the literal wording of section 22(a) revealed no explicit exception concerning
punitive damages.4 ' As punitive damages were not intended to be gifts, nor to be
considered return of capital, they lapsed into the category of "income from what-
ever source derived"42 and were therefore includible as income.43
Subsequent to the Glenshaw Glass opinion, the courts have steadfastly
adhered to the plain meaning of the law in including punitive damages as income
not specifically excluded by the Act.
Im. COURTS SETTLE INTO A WAY OF THmKING
A. 1954 Statute
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 4modified the wording of the dam-
age award exclusion. The new section 104(a)(2) read: "gross income does not
include.., the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement)
on account of personal injuries or sickness." 45 The wording change resulted from
Congressional desire to distinguish employer-paid benefits. 4 All other aspects of
the statute, including the essence of the damage award exclusion, were to remain
unchanged.47
37. Id. at 342.
38. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
39. Id. at 427.
40. Id. at 432.
41. Id. at 429.
42. Id. (quoting I.R.C. § 61(a)).
43. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U. S. at 432-33.
44. See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 1 (1954).
45. Id. at 30.
46. See S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 470 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N 4621, 4817.
Congress intended to include as taxable any "amounts received by an employee, to the extent
that such amounts are attributable to contributions by the employer which were not includible
in the gross income of the employee." Id.
47. Id.; See H.R. REP. No. 83-1337, at 347 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4025,
4168-69.
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B. Adding and Defining Nuances
Decisions from the Circuit courts and the Tax Court focused on the new
statutory language. In 1963, prior to the bulk of damage award litigation, the
Fourth Circuit decided Commissioner v. Liftin.4" The Liftin court considered
whether income received from discounted notes is taxable before the cost of the
notes have been recouped.49 The court noted that "it is, of course, true that there
is no gain constituting income until the investment has been recovered in full.""0
Further, "where it is shown that the amount of realizable discount gain is uncer-
tain or that there is 'doubt whether the contract (will) be completely carried out,'
the payments should be considered as a return of cost until the full amount there-
of has been recovered .... ,,5" Thus the basic element of the return of capital con-
cept previously established was reinforced - return of capital was held to be
excludable from income.52
1. Tort or Tort-Like Nature of the Claim
Meanwhile, the Treasury Regulations had added the requirement to sec-
tion 104(a)(2) that, to be excludable from income, damages received must result
from causes of action based upon tort or tort-like rights. 3
As follows, the Tax Court decision in Seay v. CommissioneM began the
judicial development of taxability of tort settlements and awards. The Seay court
considered whether a portion of the settlement received on a breach of contract
claim against an employer is includible as income.5 The plaintiff instructed his
attorney to file suit for breach of contract upon termination by his employer cor-
poration's board of directors,56 arguing that the subsequent negative publicity
humiliated and embarrassed the plaintiff, a cause of action for defamation was
included.57 The parties eventually settled the claim, with payment of damages to
the plaintiff.58 The court held that taxability of the settlement depends first upon
the nature of the claim.59 Further, if the nature of the claim is one for personal
48. Commissioner v. Liftin, 317 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1963).
49. Id. at 234.
50. Id. at 235.
51. Id. at 236 (quoting Hatch v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 254, 252 (2nd Cir. 1951) (alteration
in original)).
52. Id.
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1961).
54. Seay v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 32 (1972), acq. in result, 1972-2 C.B.3.
55. Id. at 32.
56. Id. at 37.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 34.
59. Seay, 58 T.C. at 37.
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injury, then that income is exempt.' A portion of the Seay settlement was received
"as compensation for such personal embarrassment, mental and physical strain
and injury to health and personal reputation in the community as petitioner had
suffered. 16' Thus, the nature of the settlement was held to be defamatory. Since
defamation is a personal injury, the Seay personal embarrassment claim was held
exempt from income.62 The remaining portion was simply compensation.
The Internal Revenue Service ("Service") affirmed the Seay reasoning
when, in 1972, it issued a revenue ruling holding that a settlement award for a
civil rights violation is includible as income.63 The Service concurred that the
nature of the claim on which the damages were based would govern. 4 The
Service based its conclusion on a somewhat imperfect ordinary income analogy
to an earlier U.S. Supreme Court case where the damages received for a lease can-
cellation were actually a substitute for rent that would have been paid.6 Therefore,
since the nature of the claim amounted to a contractual recovery in the form of a
rent substitute, the damage award was includible in income.
2. Agreement or Payor's Intent
In a case decided prior to the Seay case, the Tenth Circuit holding in
Knuckles v. Commissioner considered the question of whether settlement amounts
were paid due to personal injury or for another reason.6 In Knuckles, a taxpayer
filed suit for breach of contract against his employer.6 The parties agreed to set-
tle the matter with payment of damages by the employer .6 The employer agreed
to the settlement amount, but continually denied any liability in tort.69 The court
held the award includible because the settlement turned on a tort claim, with
respect to which the employer vehemently denied liability." The court reasoned
that "[t]he most important fact in making that determination, in the absence of an
express personal injury settlement agreement, is the intent of the payor as to the
purpose in making the payment." 1 Here, the employer's sole purpose for settling
with the petitioner was to avoid damaging publicity; no evidence existed as to
60. Id. at 37.
61. Id. at 38.
62. Id. at 40.
63. Rev. Rul. 72-341, 1972-2 C.B. 32
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Knuckles v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1965).
67. Id. at 611.
68. Id. at 612.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 613.
71. Knuckles, 349 F.2d at 613 (emphasis added).
1997]
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actual tort liability.' The logic of the case dictates that, if the payor intends the
award or settlement to be a personal injury payment, that award would be exempt
from income.
3. Exclusion of Punitive Damages: Misplaced
In 1975 a new revenue ruling extended the Service's concept of damage
award excludability. An employee had been killed when his employer's airplane
crashed. 73 The wrongful death settlement agreement called for an award in return
for a release of all claims by the deceased's executor.74 The issue dealt with
whether the award constituted excludable personal injury compensation or puni-
tive damages.7 The Service affirmed its prior position that section 104(a)(2)
excludes from gross income any amount received for personal injuries. 76 The
Service noted that the employee suffered a personal injury, "[t]herefore, under
section 104(a)(2) any damages, whether compensatory or punitive, received on
account of personal injuries or sickness are excludable from gross income.'"" Here
the Service, for whatever reason, went beyond the concept of return of capital and
essentially began the confusion which led to the ultimate destruction of a true
return of capital concept in this context.
4. Return of Capital and Nature of the Claim
That same year the United States Supreme Court decided Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody.78 Albemarle Paper involved a racial discrimination class
action claim by black employees against their employer.79 The plaintiffs request-
ed back pay and the Court decided that back pay should be awarded." Upon
determination of the nature of the damages, the Court considered the origin of
Title VII stating that, "[iut is also the purpose of Title VII to make persons whole
for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination."8' The
make whole concept stemmed from the National Labor Relations Act wherein
public policy demanded that employees be made whole for unfair labor practice
losses, as a restoration of pre-wrong status.' Ideally, any damage award would
72. Id.
73. See Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47; see also Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32, revoking
Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
79. Id. at 408.
80. Id. at 413.
81. Id. at 418.
82. Id. at 419.
[VOL. 13
8
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 13 [1997], Art. 5
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol13/iss1/5
PERSONAL INJURY EXCLUSION
make the employee whole again, and would thus represent a return of the indi-
vidual's capital. The Albemarle Paper opinion demonstrates the judicial thought
process behind damages awarded pursuant to the Civil Rights Act.
In determining whether damage settlements are includible in income, the
Tax Court in 1981 again considered the nature of the claim in the case styled
Glynn v. Commissioner.3 In Glynn, the plaintiff threatened suit against his
employer for wrongful termination and obtained a judgment." While the case
ultimately settled, the nature of the settlement turned, not on damages for person-
al injury, but on payment for accrued sick leave." The court held the payment
includible, as the settlement was contractual in nature rather than personal.16 This
case is not troubling in theory, although, with respect to the settlement, plaintiff's
counsel was seemingly unaware of the appropriate tax analysis.
5. Limitation of Pleadings: Nature of the Claim
The Sixth Circuit further refined claims for damage award excludability
in Wolfson v. Commissioneru In Wolfson, the plaintiff sued his university for fail-
ing to reflect the plaintiff's status as an employee rather than a student.8 The
plaintiff's claim was based on lost earnings rather than personal injury, and the
recovery was held includible in income. 9 Although the plaintiff had also request-
ed damages for injury to his reputation, the appellate court refused to address the
personal injury, and awarded damages based strictly on lost earnings.'
6. Personal or Professional Injury: Not Physical Injury
In 1983, the Tax Court decided Church v. Commissioner.' Here, the
plaintiff, the Attorney General for the State of Arizona, filed a defamation action
against a newspaper which called the plaintiff a communist.9 The plaintiff was
awarded compensatory damages which the Commissioner held includible in
income.93 The Tax Court found that the plaintiff had suffered personal injury in the
83. Glynn v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 116 (1981), aff'd, 676 F.2d 682 (1st. Cir. 1982).
84. Id. at 118.
85. Id. at 120.
86. Id. at 121.
87. Wolfson v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1981).
88. Id. at 1230.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Church v. Commisisoner, 80 T.C. 1104 (1983).
92. Id. at 1105.
93. Id. at 1106.
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form of public embarrassment and humiliation' and that the damage award com-
pensated the plaintiff for his mental pain and suffering. 95 The court observed that
not only had the plaintiff's professional reputation suffered, but also the stigma of
being labeled a communist would personally follow him throughout his life.96 In
fact, this personal thrust was the essence of the taxpayer's case. The court held
that these damages constituted a personal injury pursuant to section 104(a)(2), and
the court held the award excludable.97 Rather than reaching a conclusion based
upon Roemer v. Commissioner,98 the Church Court distinguished Roemer and held
that damages received for personal injuries or sickness are not limited to physical
trauma but do include mental pain and suffering. 99
In Roemer v. Commissioner,"° the Ninth Circuit affirmed that since 1918,
tort damages received for personal injuries have been excludable on the theory
that the injured party has suffered enough.'' Therefore, damages have been held
excludable if the plaintiff can show that they were received due to an injury to per-
sonal reputation.'02 The Roemer court makes a distinction between personal and
nonpersonal injuries, but not between physical and nonphysical injuries. In fact,
the Code and the regulations were, at this point, silent about requiring a personal
injury to be physical in order to be excludable. 101 The Roemer opinion reasons that
the ordinary meaning of personal injury is not limited to a physical injury, as non-
physical injuries may also be personal injuries. 05 Roemer involved a defamation
action by the plaintiff, an insurance executive, against a credit reporting firm
which falsely reported the plaintiff's professional practices to other insurance
companies.' °0 This court distinguished between compensation for injury to per-
sonal reputation and injury to professional reputation,/°7 but concluded that
defamation is simply a tort-like personal injury and that "[t]he personal nature of
an injury should not be defined by its effect."'' 0 Thus, if a tort-type injury affects
94. Id. at 1108.
95. Id. at 1110.
96. Church, 80 T.C. at 1110.
97. Id.
98. Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Rev. Rul. 85-143,
1985-2 C.B. 55.
99. Church, 80 T.C. at 1109.
100. Roemer, 716 F.2d at 693.
101. Id. at 696.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 697.
104. Id.
105. Roemer, 716 F.2d at 697.
106. Id. at 695.
107. Id. at 699.
108. Id.
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a plaintiff's professional career, the award would still be excludable because the
injury was personal.101
7. The Service
The Service continued its own struggle with the issuance of a 1984 rev-
enue ruling"0 which held that damages received under a wrongful death act are
excludable from income because those damages "restore a loss of capital.""' The
Service went on, however, to conclude that damages received under a wrongful
death act providing exclusively for punitive damages are not excludable, as those
damages represent an accession to wealth." 2 Such conclusion with respect to puni-
tive damages is consistent with.the return of capital theory. However, this ruling
does call into question the holding of the Service's earlier Revenue Ruling 75-45
which had decided that any personal injury damages, whether compensatory or
punitive, are excludable from gross income. "I
The following year the Service issued another revenue ruling denouncing
the Roemer decision stating that "[tlo the extent damages received by the taxpay-
er are for an injury to the taxpayer's business, they are not attributable to a per-
sonal injury and are not excludable under section 104(a)(2)."'' a This ruling may
not be destructive of the return of capital approach, as there can be a distinction
between business and personal injury; however, Roemer's "effect ' '"' argument
should prevail.
8. Personal and Professional Injury: Still a Problem
Threlkeld v. Commissioner concerned the effect of damages awarded for
a malicious prosecution claim."16 The plaintiff in Threlkeld was awarded damages
for injury to his professional and credit reputation."7 The Tax Court noted that the
law is well settled that includibility of damages depend upon the nature of the
claim and not the validity of the claim."8 The court found no difference in dam-
109. Id. at 700.
110. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32, revoking Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47.
114. Rev. Rul. 85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55.
115. Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d at 693, 699 (9th Cir. 1983).
116. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
117. Id. at 1294-95.
118. Id. at 1297.
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ages received on account of injury to personal reputation and those received on
account of injury to professional reputation."9 The court proceeded to examine
personal injuries and determined that personal injury includes more than just bod-
ily injury.20 Common-law tort concepts predominated, 2' and the court conclud-
ed that an action for malicious prosecution is a personal injury: "exclusion under
section 104 will be appropriate if compensatory damages are received on account
of any invasion of the rights that an individual is granted by virtue of being a per-
son in the sight of the law."'22 In holding that an injury to professional reputation
is equivalent to an injury to personal reputation, the Tax Court in Threlkeld seem-
ingly ignored the Service's 1985 revenue ruling which had attempted to distin-
guish personal from professional injury.'23
9. Cause of Action Under Civil Rights Act
Another Tax Court decision examined whether settlement proceeds from
a sex discrimination suit are excludable from income. In Metzger v.
Commissioner,'24 the plaintiff benefitted from a negotiated settlement with respect
to her employer's failure to grant her tenure.'2 The Tax Court stated that "it is not
necessary that the damages be on account of physical trauma" in order to be
excludable from income,'26 and analogized such legal right to a tort-like right.
According to the Metzger court, Civil Rights Act section 1983 claims are person-
al injury claims.27 "We conclude that, under both the language of the statute and
the interpretation of it that is provided by the regulation, gross income does not
include damages received under a sec. 1983 claim based on violation of petition-
er's First Amendment right to free speech.' '2 Additionally, actions based on sec-
tions 1981, 1982, 1985(3) and 1986 are also personal injury actions and also
excludable.'29 The court declared that it could not imagine a more fundamental
injury to a person's individual rights than racial discrimination, and similarly, that
proceeds from sex discrimination claims are personal injuries to be excluded from
income.1'0 Again, the emphasis is focused on the inherent return of capital for
tort-like recoveries whether or not physical injury exists.
119. Id. at 1298.
120. Id. at 1305.
121. See Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1305.
122. Id. at 1308.
123. Rev. Rul. 85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55.
124. Metzger v. Commissisoner, 88 T.C. 834 (1987), aff'd, 845 F.2d 1013 (3d. Cir. 1988).
125. Id. at 837.
126. Id. at 847.
127. Id. at 851.
128. Id.
129. Metzger 845 F.2d at 852.
130. Id. at 853.
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Bent v. Commissioner' followed the reasoning of the Metzger opinion in-
determining whether proceeds received from an award of a First Amendment free-
dom of speech action are excludable from income.'32 The plaintiff in Bent open-
ly criticized his employer, and was then terminated as a result.'33 The resulting
suit led to an award for damages.Im The court agreed that freedom of speech
claims are tort-like rights enforceable under section 1983.' 3 Although the plain-
tiff's injuries did not involve physical trauma, they did involve mental pain and
suffering which are elements of compensatory damages under section 1983.36
10. Civil Rights Cause of Action: Sex Discrimination
The Fourth Circuit also extended excludability to liquidated damages
received in a sex discrimination action. In Thompson v. Commissioner,'3' the
plaintiff initiated a class action suit against her employer, the United States
Government, because the employer paid higher wages to male employees than to
female employees for the same work performed.'38 The plaintiff was awarded both
back pay and damages categorized in the opinion as liquidated damages, all of
which the Commissioner claimed were includible in income.'39 In analyzing the
liquidated damage claim, the court used the definition of tort to hold that "sex dis-
crimination actions in general are tort or tort-like actions and damages awarded
for violation of that right are damages for personal injuries."'" The court agreed
with the Service, however, that back pay should be includible as gross income. 4'
The author suggests that the distinction between liquidated and compensatory
damages in the context of the return of capital exclusion is irrelevant to this analy-
sis.
11. Fair Labor Standards Act
Chronologically, another Third Circuit decision followed in Byrne v.
Commissioner.'42 The plaintiff in Byrne sued her employer under the wrongful
131. Bent v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987).
132. Id. at 68.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 68-69.
135. Id. at 69.
136. Bent, 835 F.2d at 69-70.
137. Thompson v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1988).
138. Id. at.710.
139. Id. at 710-711.
140. Id. at 712.
141. Id.
142. Byrne v. Commissioner, 883 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1989).
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discharge provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act and under state law, and was
awarded damages. 43 The court reversed the Tax Court for erroneously equating
nonpersonal injury claims to contract claims and essentially determining that one-
half of the award was not excludable.'" Again, the court used the definition of
tort to show that the plaintiff's wrong was more tort-like than contract-like, not-
ing that an award for wrongful discharge is for an injury of a personal nature and
not for mere economic loss: The court held the award excludable.' 45 An irrelevant
inquiry sidetracks the analysis, as no direct or automatic correlation between con-
tract claims and nonpersonal injuries exists.
12. Punitive Damages: Dicta
In Miller v. Commissioner, the plaintiff recovered both compensatory and
punitive damages in a defamation action.1 46 The Commissioner claimed the entire
award was includible in income because the award resulted from an injury to the
plaintiff's professional reputation.'47 However, the Tax Court reasoned that, "we
see no sound reason to construe the statute in such a way as to not afford the same
tax treatment to recoveries for all types of 'personal' injury regardless of conse-
quence."'48 Thus, the Miller court held "that section 104(a)(2) excludes the net
settlement proceeds from gross income."'49 In dicta the court stated:
Including punitive damages within the ambit of I.R.C. Section
104(a)(2) does not produce an absurd result. Punitive damages have
served as a means of compensating plaintiffs for intangible harm and
for cost and attorneys' fees. Although they may serve these purposes
to a lesser extent now than in the past, the fact that punitive damages may
possess a compensatory aspect renders it reasonable to afford them the
protection of section 104(a)(2). It also might explain why Congress
in 1918 did not expressly limit the statutory exclusion to compen-
satory damages.
The legislative history provides no sound basis for disregarding the
plain meaning of the statute .... While statutes involving exclusions
from income are generally narrowly construed, without a clearer indi-
143. Id. at 212-213.
144. Id. at 215.
145. Id. at 215-16.
146. Miller v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 330 (1989).
147. Id. at 335.
148. Id. at 337.
149. Id.
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cation of Congressional intent, we will not contort the statutory lan-
guage. We therefore hold than any portion of the net settlement pro-
ceeds which represents punitive damages is excluded from gross
income by section 104(a)(2).111
The gratuitous exclusion of punitive damages with regard to the return of
capital analysis may well have led to the impasse, whether tacit or explicit, which
resulted in the ultimately illogical and inappropriate turns taken by the courts and
the Congress. The author asserts that punitive damages should not be excluded in
the context of the return of capital analysis.
In 1989, possibly in response to Miller, Congress again changed the
wording of the damage award statute in perhaps the last objective and consistent
utterance in the return of capital context from Washington. The new language
read: "Paragraph (2) shall not apply to any punitive damages in connection with
a case not involving physical injury or physical sickness."' 5' Again, the return of
capital context, there is no need for the distinction. The exclusion should not
apply to any punitive damage recovery.
13. ADEA
The Third Circuit agreed with the Threlkeld and Roemer decisions and
held that proceeds pursuant to an Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA") claim are tort-like and therefore excludable.'52 In Rickel v.
Commissioner, '" the plaintiff sued his employer for wrongful termination because
of his age, and received a settlement payment.)5 The court held that age discrim-
ination is more analogous to a personal injury tort than to contract.' 5 Age dis-
crimination invades a personal right, as the employer has a statutory duty to
refrain from age discrimination, and thus, manifests itself as a tort claim. ' The
court reasoned that nonpersonal consequences do not transform discrimination
into a nonpersonal injury. 7 Damages received for age discrimination, even
though nonphysical, are personal and therefore excludable. 5, Notably, however,
150. Id. at 341 (citations omitted).
151. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239 § 7641, 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. (103 Stat.) 2106, 2379.
152. Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 656 (3d Cir. 1990).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 656-57.
155. Id. at 662.
156. Id.
157. Rickel, 900 F.2d at 662-63.
158. Id. at 664.
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the court agreed with Glenshaw Glass in that punitive damages are not a restora-
tion of capital, and must be includible in income.59 It is the author's suggestion
that the Rickel court understood the law as it had evolved preceding its determi-
nation.
The Sixth Circuit followed suit in the 1990 Pistillo v. Commissioner 16)
decision when it held age discrimination proceeds are excludable from income.
The plaintiff was awarded damages for his claim that he was wrongfully termi-
nated because of age. 61 The Pistillo court analogized age discrimination to a tort-
like right to redress personal injuries, noting that a loss of wages does not trans-
form discrimination into a nonpersonal injury.' 62 The court held that the plaintiff
suffered a tort to his dignity and was therefore personally injured, further elimi-
nating any distinction between types of personal injury, such as physical or non-
physical. 63 The court reasoned that the purpose of the ADEA is to make victims
whole by recognizing personal indignities. 64 Therefore as recovery for a person-
al injury, proceeds from an age discrimination suit are excludable from income.
The Ninth Circuit examined the nature of settlement payments and dam-
age awards in the age discrimination context in Redfield v. Insurance Co. of North
America. ' 1 The federal district court had awarded the plaintiff economic dam-
ages, emotional distress damages and punitive damages for injuries suffered as a
result of age discrimination. 66 The defendant employer withheld federal income
tax from the payment representing economic damages, and the plaintiff com-
plained. 67 The Redfield court found that age discrimination claims, as in Rickel'0
and Pistillo6 9 are tort-like recoveries for personal injuries.'70 Further, the court
stated that there is no difference between settlement payments and damage
awards.1
In analyzing causes of action subject to the personal injury award exclu-
sion, courts have included defamation, public embarrassment, malicious prosecu-
159. Id. at 666.
160. Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145, 146 (6th Cir. 1990).
161. Id. at 147.
162. Id. at 149-50.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Redfield v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 940 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1991).
166. Id. at 544.
167. Id.
168. Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990).
169. Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990).
170. Redfield, 940 F.2d at 547.
171. Id.
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tion, freedom of speech, wrongful discharge, sex discrimination, age discrimina-
tion and many civil rights violations as personal injuries, and awards from those
actions have been excluded from income. The courts declared that the injury must
be personal, not contractual, and that the intent of the payor controls in the
absence of a written settlement agreement. The personal injury must be tort-like.
Further, the consensus of the courts in tacitly applying the make whole or return
of capital concept finds no requirement that a personal injury be physical to be
excludable. Thus, the courts do not require a distinction between physical and
nonphysical injuries to be excludable from income.
IV. TURNING THE TIDE
A. The 1986 Act and 1989 Changes
Congress passed major tax reform legislation in 1986.'17 Although the
legislation did not change the wording of section 104(a)(2), the 1989 amendment
previously mentioned did change the wording to exclude punitive damages in
cases involving nonphysical injuries or sickness."' This change would have an
impact on the tax aspects of damage award exclusion, but this change does not
effect, as referenced earlier, the return of capital analysis.
The recent case of Sparrow v. Commissioner74 questioned whether back
pay awarded pursuant to a racial discrimination claim is includible in gross
income. The plaintiff in Sparrow filed suit against his employer, The Department
of the Navy, for wrongful discharge and for failure to reinstate.17 The plaintiff
received payments which he claimed were for personal injury and as a result of
racial discrimination. 7 1 The Commissioner claimed that the payments represent-
ed back pay, and therefore were includible as income.'" The court found an intent
on the part of the employer to make the settlement payment a compensation pay-
ment, rather than a damage payment. 7 1 Thus the court held that the plaintiff must
first show that he received damages, and second, that they were received as com-
pensation for a personal injury in order to be excludable. 79 Furthermore, the court
found that an award must be received from an action at law in order to be exclud-
172. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 2085.
173. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
174. Sparrow v. Commissioner, 949 E2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
175. Id. at 434-35.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 436.
179. Sparrow, 949 F.2d at 436.
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able: back pay is not a legal remedy and, is therefore, not excludable.80 The court
investigated Title VII and concluded that Title VII did not provide for damage
awards. 8' The Sparrow opinion determined that an award for back pay under
Title VII is not, in effect, a return of capital; rather it represents back wages, char-
acterized as includible income. 11At best, the utilization of the law and equity dis-
tinction represents an effort by the Service to merely, by way of reaction, allevi-
ate a perceived invasion of its fiscal integrity.
Seizing upon the reasoning of the Sparrow court, the United States
Supreme Court foreshadowed its change in focus on damage award exclusions in
United States v. Burke.'83 In Burke, the plaintiff received a settlement award as a
result of a sex discrimination claim under Title VII.M The Court reasoned that the
award represented back pay and was therefore includible in income.85 As
observed, a calculation of loss based upon back pay if the loss is a tort-like per-
sonal injury does not invalidate the exclusion. However, the Court noted that
even though discrimination causes harm to individuals, it does not imply a per-
sonal tort-like injury.8 6 Title VII limits remedies to back pay, injunctions and
equitable relief." Because Title VII awards are equitable in nature, and do not
exist by operation of law, they are not excludable from income.'88 The Burke court
ignored the previous courts' rationale of personal injury, rights, and tort, instead
focusing on the distinction between law and equity to reach a conclusion incon-
sistent with the underlying statutory premise. Indeed, Congress subsequently
amended Title VII to provide a statutory tort-like cause of action.8 9
One year after Burke, the Tax Court decided Downey v. Commissioner90
Again, the issue was whether a back pay award to a United Airlines pilot under
the ADEA is includible in income. 91 The Downey court found that the ADEA
offers a wide range of remedies, including claims for back wages and liquidated
damages.'92 Thus, the ADEA compensation scheme evidenced a tort-like concept
of injury and remedy. 93 The court found that discrimination under the ADEA is
180. Id. at 438.
181. Id. at 439.
182. Id. at 440.
183. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
184. Id. at 230-31.
185. Id. at 242.
186. Id. at 238.
187. Id.
188. Burke, 504 U.S. at 242.
189. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994).
190. Downey v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. at 634 (1993), rev'd, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994).
191. Id. at 635.
192. Id. at 637.
193. Id.
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a tort-like personal injury and excludable from income.194 Following the Service's
lead, the United States Court of Appeals reversed Downey and determined that the
plaintiff had received income without benefit of the exclusion. 95
In a similar decision involving another United Airlines pilot, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Schmitz v. Commissioner'96 found that ADEA recov-
eries were excludable. In dicta the Schmitz court stated that "unlike the una-
mended version of Title VII, ADEA does not simply recompense plaintiffs for the
wages properly due them."'' The court further noted that most courts find that
civil rights violations are torts, and in the context of Burke the ADEA "establish-
es a tort-like cause of action."'98 The Schmitz court distinguished liquidated dam-
ages from punitive dam ages, holding that liquidated damages are compensatory
in nature, and as such, are received on account of personal injury, and thus exclud-
able from income.'19
B. Supreme Court Showdown
The Downey and Schmitz inconsistency provided the opportunity for the
United States Supreme Court to render its most disturbing decision in
Commissioner v. Schleier 0" The Schleier opinion analyzed another age discrim-
ination suit under the ADEA, and the Court found a back pay award includible in
income.20' In a sweeping opinion, the Court stated that exclusions to gross income
must be narrowly construed.' This, in and of itself, is a proper general statement
of law. Although the court acknowledged that personal injuries include nonphys-
ical injuries, it suggested that each element in a damage recovery must be for per-
sonal injury in order to be excludable from income.203 Back wages are not equiv-
alent to lost wages and are not considered personal injury damage awards.08 The
Court would not link personal injury to lost wages.25 The Court further stated that
ADEA injuries are economic, not personal, in nature and that Congress intended
194. Id.
195. Doivney, 100 T.C. at 634.
196. Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 E3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 515 U.S. 1139 (1995).
197. Id. at 793.
198. Id. at 793-94.
199. Id. at 796.
200. Commissioner v. Schleier, _ U.S.___ 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
201. Id. at 2161.
202. Id. at 2163.
203. Id. at 2164 n.4.
204. Id. at 2164.
205. Schleier, - U.S..__, 115 S. Ct. 2164.
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liquidated damages to be punitive.10 The conclusion that liquidated damages are,
in effect, punitive is a reach at best.
Even after accepting that certain recoveries might be tort-like, the Court
relied, perhaps erroneously, on Burke207 and construed vague, statutory require-
ments as overriding the Service's regulatory pronouncements in effect for many
years.208 It held legal injuries of an economic character cannot be characterized as
tort-like.m The Court, in effect, broke from traditional notions of personal
injuries and many years of precedent. The Court indicated that even though tort
litigation allows for liquidated damages, personal injuries of a legal character are
not sufficient to bring the claim within the regulation.2 10 The ADEA gives no com-
pensation for traditional harms associated with personal injury.21' Back wages are
economic and liquidated damages are not compensatory and therefore not based
on tort.22 A simple tort-like injury is not sufficient to exclude income."' In an
interesting note, the court recognized a recent revenue ruling calling for exclusion
from income, but ignored the implications of that ruling in its opinion.24 The
Court adds a requirement to section 104(a)(2), ruling that to be excludable from
income, both a tort-like violation as well as a physical injury must be estab-
lished.215
Justice O'Connor, in her dissent, found that age discrimination is a per-
sonal injury and that the majority equated personal injury to tangible injury, a the-
ory which was rejected by eight justices in Burke. 6 The Court's analysis, accord-
ing to Justice O'Connor, contradicts its recognition that personal injuries can be
both tangible and intangible.27 Harm to an individual's reputation and loss of
business from tort may not be physical, but still can be personal.218 Justice
O'Connor cannot reconcile the majority's failure to perceive age discrimination
as a personal injury when it recognizes that intangible harms are personal
injuries.211 If harms caused by discrimination are equivalent to personal injury,
206. Id. at 2165.
207. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S.229 (1992).
208. Schleier, __ U.S. ,115 S. Ct. at 2166.
209. Id. at 2167.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Schleier, - U.S.- 115 S. Ct. at 2167 n.8.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 2167.
216. Id. at 2167-68 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 2169.
218. Schleier, - U.S. ,115 S. Ct. at 2169-70.
219. Id.
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then damages from discrimination are received on account of personal injuries
and are therefore excludable.220 Thirty-five years of administrative rulings hold
that a tort equates to personal injury and recoveries are therefore excludable.22'
The Court has always deferred to the Service's long standing interpretive regula-
tions and rulings. 22 "[W]e give an agency's interpretations and practices consid-
erable weight where they involve the contemporaneous construction of a statute
and where they have been in long use."223 However, this Court ignored its own
practice of deference and refused to recognize the recent Service revenue rulings
when deciding Schleier. Justice O'Connor stated the regulation defined the entire
scope of section 104(a)(2) - damages received unambiguously refers to all dam-
ages.224 Adding the extra requirement of proving a physical tort-like injury to the
existing requirement of proving a personal injury requires a new condition with-
out any basis in prior law.'
In the recent case of O'Gilvie v. United States, the court traces the histo-
ry of the restoration of capital concept.226 It held the compensated taxpayer is bet-
ter off after a damage award than if the wrong had not taken place.27 The statute
fails to separate compensatory elements of damages so the Court must balance the
make whole concept with a tax equality objective?28 Punitive damages do not
compensate for any kind of loss and the Court finds no reason why Congress
would have wanted to exclude them from income. 9 Tax generosity has its lim-
its.m "Congress' primary focus, in other words, was upon what to do about non-
physical personal injuries, not upon the provision's coverage of punitive damages
under pre-existing law."23' Thus, punitive damages, even from personal injury
suits, are no longer excludable from income. This case is consistent with the
return of capital approach.
As courts diverted their focus from legal precedent to flights of fancy, the
state of the personal injury award exclusion deteriorated. Although the Service's
220. Id. at 2170.
221. Id. at 2171.
222. Id.
223. Schleier, _ U.S.___., 115 S. Ct. at 2171 (quoting Davis v. United States, 495 U. S.
472, 484 (1990)).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 2172.
226. O'Gilvie V United States, - U.S _, 117 S. Ct. 452 (1996).
227. Id. at 456.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 457.
231. O'Gilvie, _U.S._ 117 S. Ct. at 458.
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regulations required only a tort or tort-type action,232 the courts judicially added a
physical injury requirement for a personal injury damage award to be excludable
from income.
C. 1996 Legislation
In August of 1996, Congress again changed the damage award wording
of section 104(a)(2) to read that: "gross income does not include ... the amount
of any damages (other than punitive damages) received (whether by suit or agree-
ment and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal
physical injuries or physical sickness. ' 233 The House Conference Report explains
the language change, by stating that the statute has been interpreted too broadly
by some courts.21 The report justifies that the change in statutory wording came
about as a result of the United States Supreme Court's recent holdings.
235
V. CONCLUSION
A tort is a "legal wrong committed upon the person or property indepen-
dent of contract. ' 236 It may be either: "(1) a direct invasion of some legal right of
the individual; [or] (2) the infraction of some public duty by which special dam-
age accrues to the individual. '237 A legal wrong does not specify a physical
wrong. A tort may be a nonphysical or intangible wrong as well. The United
States Supreme Court's requirement of finding a physical, tort-type personal
injury in Burke and Schleier contradicts the customary and accepted meaning of
tort as defined by the legal community.
A personal injury is one "which is an invasion of personal rights, and...
may include such injuries to the person as libel or slander, criminal conversation,
malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and mental suffering." '238 Nowhere in
this definition does personal injury require a physical injury. However, the Court
in Burke and Schleier requires a personal injury to be physical in order to be
excludable from income. The original language of the damage exclusion and the
original rationale behind the statute indicate that damage awards represent a
return of personal capital, and do not represent income. This approach is still
worthwhile.
232. Treas. Reg. 1.104-1(c) (1990).
233. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)(1997)(emphasis added).
234. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-737, at 677 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677,
1792.
235. Id.
236. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1489 (6th ed. 1990).
237. Id.
238. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 786 (6th ed. 1990).
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With the return of capital concept permeating for over sixty-five years,
the United States Supreme Court suddenly and inexplicably changed the rules.
Congress ordinarily implements laws in response to public or governmental pres-
sure. As to this statute, however, Congress may have enacted laws in response to
a court decision and its own perceived floodgate mentality. Courts ordinarily
interpret laws passed by Congress. With respect to this statute, however, the
Court wrote the law by adding extra requirements, and Congress passed the
statute accordingly.
Has the law run amok from the return of capital concept? Has the Service
overreacted to some perceived raid on our fiscal'integrity? Has Congress overre-
acted utilizing an erroneous Supreme Court decision as its rationale? Have the
courts vacated a fundamentally reasonable and sympathetic approach recognized
for many years by the Service, to exclude damage awards from income? The
Burke and Schleier decisions evaporate the last vestiges of the return of capital
concept by relegating to gross income all but the narrowest damage awards.
Damage awards no longer represent restoration of an individual's capital, they no
longer make a person whole, they now only represent a perceived, though non-
existent, windfall to be shared with the government. Slash those wrists! The rem-
edy is legislative!
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